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Summary findings
Jacobson and Tarr summarize the rich and varied  forces are weak, however, and important public interests
experiences of private and public provision of urban  are at stake, strengthening government institutions may
services in France, Great Britain, and the United States  be a prerequisite for successful privatization.
over the past 100 years. Their main focus is on  *  In the electric utility industry, private firms played a
experiences in the United States and on shifts back and  far greater role in U.S. electric utilities than in Great
forth between the public and private sectors. A few of  Britain, in part because of different views about
their observations:  appropriate  roles for government in providing essential
* The values of politically important actors as well as  services. For similar reasons, the state played a much
the working of government,  political, and legal  larger role in furnishing telecommunications services in
institutions have shaped decisions about infrastructure  France than  in the United States.
development, the sorts of public goods demanded, and  *  Beliefs about the "publicness" of different goods and
the roles played by private firms.  services have helped shape the character of regulatory,
* The range of choices that has historically been made  franchise, and contracting arrangements. When a good is
with respect to the ownership, financing, and operation  seen as mainly private, it is easier for private service
of different infrastructures has been far too varied to be  providers to be compensated mainly by user fees and for
encompassed by simple distinctions between "public"  most decisions about price, output,  and quality of service
and  "private."  to be left to them. But for goods viewed as public and
* Throughout  the world, many infrastructures owned  subsidized by taxes, government agencies make many
and operated by governments have been built by private  decisions about price, output,  and quality, no matter
firms.  what  the role played by private firms in actually
*  In the United States, private firms and property-  providing services.
owners associations of various sorts have owned outright  *  Goods defined as "public" have often been provided
both toll roads and residential streets. Private firms have  free to users, even though it would have been easy to
also collected solid wastes and provided urban transport  exclude nonpayers. Examples in the United States
under a range of franchise, contracting,  and regulatory  include interstate highway systems, public parks, public
arrangements. The situation with mass transit has been  libraries, and police and fire protection.  Free services
similar in Great Britain. Although water works facilities  have been provided because it is believed that in these
in France are predominantly government-owned,  private  domains market relationships should not apply - and
firms operate and manage most systems under an array  that denying nonpayers the public service would be a
of contracting and leasing arrangements.  denial of rights.
* Even when facilities have been owned by private  *  In Great Britain and the United States, the
firms, direct competition has been of limited importance  contracting out of public services has been both
in the provision of many kinds of infrastructure. But  supported  and opposed because of its potential to break
market discipline can arise from other sources.  the power of public sector unions and to cut workers'
*  Privatization can get government bureaucracies out  pay. In the United States, privatization has also come
of the business of performing entrepreneurial activities  under attack on the grounds that opportunities for
for which they may be poorly suited. When market  minority employment may be reduced.
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In physical terms, infrastructure can be viewed as the structures and networks that frame
and bind together modern cities and metropolitan areas and make it possible to undertake social
and economic activity. It is the streets and the highways, the waste disposal systems, the water
and sewer lines, the electric and gas supply and distribution facilities, and the telecommunication
networks (Tarr 1984b:  1). In the language of economics, such facilities manifest both public
goods and natural monopoly attributes. Positive economic spillovers can be large and good-
quality services can provide diffuse public benefits and raise property values (Aschauer 1991:21-
68), even thought ongoing competition.undercuts the need for expensive duplicate capital
facilities. Public buildings and parks and recreation areas can also be viewed as infrastructure, as
can such labor-intensive services as solid waste disposal, police, fire, and emergency services,
which underpin the quality of urban life and are generally considered a public, or governmental,
responsibility.
This essay will focus primarily on the complex and varied history of infrastructure and
service delivery in the United States. For purposes of comparison, however, there will be some
discussion of experiences in Great Britain and France.  As shall be seen, the history of
infrastructure in these countries has been quite different from that in the United States, despite
many similarities. Even a cursory  overview of the history of infrastructure in all three countries
makes it clear that there has been enormous variation over time with respect to:
* The public and private provision of services: History provides many examples of
movement toward privatization and vice versa.
* Levels of government furnishing or overseeing infrastructure provision. In the
United States, Great Britain, and France, shifts between city, state, and federal
activity in the ownership and regulation of some forms of infrastructure have been
quite common.
* Spending and investment patterns: Spending cycles in all three countries are
marked by bursts of spending followed by periods of retrenchment and stability.
While this essay focuses primarily on the shifts between public and private service
provision, it is impossible to separate this theme from the other two.  Nor does a simple
distinction between "public" and "private" really encompass the range of arrangements that has
existed with respect to the ownership, financing, and the operation of facilities.
At any given time over the last century or so, one could have found the following mix of
arrangements with respect to nominally government owned facilities in the United States:
Funding Arrangements:
Funded by user fees.
Free to users, funded by tax assessments.
3Free to users, funded  by assessments  on abutting  property  holders.
A combination  of any of the above.
Operating  Arrangements:
Government  agencies  build  and operate facility.
Some or all of construction  of facility  contracted  out to private  firm.
Some  or all of operation  of facility  contracted  out to private  firm.
With regard to financing  privately  owned  infrastructure,  similar  variation  can be found,
combining  some  measure  of user fees and of subsidies  drawn  from tax assessments.
In the United States,  the main  methods  employed  for facilities  operation  have  been
franchise  contracts  (usually  by municipalities)  and ongoing  forms of regulation  over price and
service  terms, with the primary  activity  taking  place  at the state and federal  levels  of government
Ownership and infrastructure in the United States
Forms  of infrastructure ownership, financing, and government involvement have varied
enormously  in the United  States at different  places  and times. This variation  has arisen  in the
context of a complex  federal  political  system  with numerous  partially  independent  decisionmaking
authorities. Although  the size and relative  importance  of the federal  government  has greatly
increased  since  the 1930s,  a large proportion  of policymaking  concerning  infrastructures
continues  to take place  at local and state  levels. The presence  of multiple  centers  of authority  has
made experimentation  possible,  despite  the system's  inability  to change  rapidly.  Because  of
divisions  of authority  amongst  executives,  legislatures,  and courts  and among  levels  of
government,  wide-ranging  reforms  of any sort with respect  to the ownership  and governance  of
infrastructure  have  been less common  in the United  States than in other countries.
Two sets of broad  and at times conflicting  ideas  have  played  the greatest  role in shaping
decisions  to construct  infrastructures  and networked  systems  in the United  States and  in
determining  their ownership  and regulatory  status. The first of these ideas-and  probably  the
most important  overall-has been the widely  held  belief  that development  of networked  systems
should  be pursued  in such a way as to maximize  overall  economic  development  and individual
economic  opportunity. From the very  beginnings  of the nineteenth  century  to the present  day,
networked  systems  and forms of infrastructure  ranging  from traditional  waterworks,  turnpikes,
and railroads  to proposed  national  "data  highway"  have been  conceived  as economic  development
tools. At the same  time,  broad fears of irresponsible  accumulations  of either  political  or economic
power  have also shaped  public  policies  toward infrastructures.  In the United  States, with some
interesting  exceptions,  such  fears have  led to the development  of private approaches  for
infrastructure  management.  Private  ownership  (even of a monopoly)  has been  justified  as both
more consistent  with values of individual  initiative  than is government  provision  and as a counter-
balance  to political  excesses.
4American  federalism  also pushes  in the same  direction. When compared  to the scale  of
electric  utility,  telephones,  and even some  waterworks  systems,  municipalities  (and even  some
states) are relatively  small. Local  and state  jurisdictions  have  therefore  competed  strongly  for
infrastructure  projects,  with local and state governments  implementing  policies  to encourage  (and
even  subsidize)  the construction  of infrastructure  and reduce  the cost to private  firms  involved.
Privately  owned  service  providers,  furthermore,  have often  been able  to gain  relief  from
govermnental  decisions  unfavorable  to them  by exploiting  divisions  of political  authority  between
local, state, and federal  levels  of government  or by turning  to the state or federal  judiciary
(Scheiber  1975). Government  and mixed  approaches  for the provision  of infrastructures  have
been implemented  only where  private  provision  seemed  impracticable  or inadequate.
Infrastructure services in U.S. cities
Roads and streets
Roads and streets are perhaps  the oldest of all forms  of infrastructure  and continue  to play
vital roles in the circulation  of people  and commerce  among  and within  centers  of habitation.
Virtually  all of the funding  and ownership  arrangements  listed above  have  been applied  at one
time or another to roads and streets in the United  States. Although  pragmatic  and decentralized
decisionmaking  has made for the use of a wide variety  of expedients  in different  circumstances,
some  broad patterns  can be discerned. Interestingly,  consistency  is greater with respect  to
financing  than with respect to ownership.  Within  cities  and inhabited  places,  financing  for streets
(whether  publicly  or privately  owned)  has been most widely  and regularly  obtained  from
assessments  on property  or from general  tax revenues. Except for charges  for the parking  of cars,
user fees are virtually  unknown. For routes outside  of densely  populated  areas,  user fees in the
form of tolls have  been  more common  at various  times,  but here,  too, support  through
assessments  on property  (or more  recently  fuel taxes and general  tax revenues)  have  always  been
far more  common.
With respect  to routes outside  of cities,  the heyday  of privately  owned  and operated  roads
supported  by user fees came  during  the early  decades  of the nineteenth  century. Many  roads were
built and maintained  by state-chartered  turnpike  companies.  Details  of the charters  and franchises
varied,  but in general,  both tolls and  broadly  defined  standards  of construction  and maintenance
were specified. Particularly  in the less-populated  westem  areas of the country,  such  tumpikes
served  a developmental  function,  with benefits  accruing  not only  to users of the facility  but also to
landholders  in entire  regions,  whose property  values  were raised  by the improved  access. In some
instances,  states issued  private  turnpike  companies  land  grants so they could capture a portion  of
this gain  and thus be recompensed  for high  capital  costs during  the early years,  when traffic
volumes  and revenues  from tolls  were meager. But unlike  local and state governments,
companies  could not legally  obtain  ongoing  recompense  from rising  property  values  through  the
assessment  of tax levies. Partly as a result of this handicap  and partly as a result of competition
from canals  and railroads  by the 1860s,  most private  toil roads had been  turned over to states and
counties  for operation  from general  tax revenues  (Bruchey  1965:124-40).
Use of toll charges  to underwrite  the provision  of major limited-access  roads outside  of
urban  areas experienced  a resurgence  during  the 1930s  and 1940s. A major  institutional
5arrangement  employed  was the public  authority. Like the turnpike companies  of the nineteenth
century,  such authorities  are chartered  by the state and deputed such  governmental  powers  as the
right to condemn  land. But unlike  them, ownership  generally  remained  entirely  in state hands,
with private  investors  involved  as holders of debt  securities  (but amortized  from toll revenues
rather than equity). Examples  of such roads built  during  this period include  the Pennsylvania,
Ohio,  New Jersey,  and Massachusetts  turnpikes  and the New York State Thruway. By 1973,
there were 4,100 miles  of toll road in the United  States. Most limited-access  highways  in the
nation  and virtually  all other major  roads,  however,  are not only government  owned  but free to
users. Major sources  of revenue  include  earmarked  fuel-tax  revenues  and road-use  fees for trucks
and busses,  usually  assessed  on a flat,  yearly  basis. Private  firms  have  been involved  primarily  not
as owners  of facilities  but as operators  of food and fuel concessions  at turnpike rest areas and as
engineering  and construction  contractors  (Keating  1989:86-8).
As noted, patterns  within  cities  have  differed  from those outside. With user fees and tolls
virtually  unknown,  a wide variety  of private,  public,  and mixed  development  strategies  have  been
employed  in the United  States so as to draw upon increased  property  values  to finance  the
construction  and maintenance  of streets and thoroughfares.  At times,  choices  have  been
contentious  due to the substantial  financial  stakes and questions  of access  and privacy  involved.
In nineteenth-century  American  cities,  politicians  were sensitive  to the manner  in which  decisions
concerning  streets could  win  them support  from influential  businessmen,  citizens,  and
neighborhood  groups  as well  as provide  them with opportunities  for patronage  and kickbacks.
City  councils  usually  responded  quickly  to requests  for street openings  or improvements  that were
commerce  serving  and furthered  the prosperity  of businesses  in major commercial  sections.
General  tax revenues  were often  used for this purpose  as well  as assessments  on abutters,  and
ownership  was almost  always  secured  in public  hands.
Residential  neighborhoods  were a different  story. One widely  employed  approach  was for
the municipality  to undertake  improvements  only upon the petition  of a certain  proportion  of
abutting  property  holders. When  the petitions  were granted,  the city would  collect  special
assessments  from all abutters. In many  cases,  however,  assessments  were not fully  paid and costs
had to be covered  from the general  tax fund or the improvement  was terminated.
From the late nineteenth  century  onward,  the private sector became  more directly
involved. In many  cities,  real estate developers  laid  out and constructed  some  streets,  recouping
costs through  the sale of lots. Typically,  the streets  would  then be deeded  over to a municipal
government  to be maintained  out of general  revenues-most of which  were themselves  obtained
through  property  tax assessments  (Weiss 1987:40-1). In some  instances,  however,  developers
turned over streets and other infrastructure  not to municipal  governments  but to private  home
owner  associations  empowered  to assess  fees on members  for upkeep  and maintenance.
An example  of a case  where streets remained  private  is in the St. Louis metropolitan  area,
where  a number  of privately  owned  and maintained  residential  streets (these were ninety  private-
street subdivisions  during  the high  point of such  development)  have  existed  as self-governing
enclaves  since  the mid-nineteenth  century. The rationale  for the high number  of private streets in
Saint  Louis  appears  to have rested on the desire  for land-use  restrictions  and infrastructure
superior  to that offered  by the municipality  (In 1880, St. Louis  ranked  eighth  in per capita
6expenditures among the nation's ten largest cities; in 1890 it ranked ninth). As one historian
writes, "Necessity demanded a heavy reliance on private enterprise to fill the gap," (Beito and
Smith 1992:270-71).  In the face of inadequate municipal infrastructure supply, developers
installed their own streets, water supplies, and sewers, often expecting to sell them to the city.
The offering of package deals of houses and infrastructure (known as "tied-sales") by nineteenth
and twentieth century developers was a common phenomenon in new subdivisions in city and in
suburb.
While most residential streets in the United States continue to remain in public hands, the
cases in which private developers choose not to deed streets over to municipalities are
increasingly common.  Here too, however, it is generally property holders rather than users who
havc borne the costs of both construction and operation.  In general this has been accomplished
by means of developers deeding ownership of streets and other common areas to property owners
association of various sorts, which, in turn, are given the right to assess yearly charges. In both
law and practice, the line between such property owner associations (generally considered private)
and municipal corporations (generally considered public, but with quite similar powers to assess
and to regulate) has been quite thin, with one form sometimes blending into the other.
One of the most vital phases of homeowner development is associated with  the rise of
large-scale real estate developers or "community  builders".  Comrnmunity  builders formed
community associations in order to enforce and adapt deed restrictions; to develop and maintain
common areas, open-space and privately-owned infrastructure; and to provide services to
residents (Weiss and Watts 1989:2). While private residential subdivisions appeared as early as
the 1830s, the major shift towards large-scale suburban subdivisions came after the 1920s. In this
phase, subdividers became full-fledged suburban housing developers, providing lots, houses,
parks, schools, shopping centers, and other community facilities. In the process, they also
assumed, as Marc Weiss and John Watts note,  the "function of being private planners for
American cities and towns," providing "private innovation preceding public action."  This process
also applied to the supplying of important community services and infrastructure, sometimes
turned over to local government and at other times continued under private control (Weiss and
Watts 1989:6-7).
Homeowner associations were increasingly  viewed as essential to residential subdivision
development.  In the 1930s the policies of the newly created Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) favored  subdivisions inhabited by residents with similar socioeconomic features,
comprehensive deed restrictions, design controls, and the use of common park and playground
facilities. With the coming of the condominium and the planned unit development (PUDS) in the
1960s, community associations greatly increased, soaring from under 500 in 1962 to over 15,000
in 1973. Driving their creation was the requirement of both condominiums and PUDS for a
community association to maintain common areas.  The purpose of community development
associations now shifted towards maintaining common property and providing services rather than
enforcing deed restrictions (Weiss and Watts 1989:18).  During the 1960s and 1970s, community
associations continued to grow in number, increasing from 25,000 in 1975 to over 90,000 ten
years later (50,000 were condominium associations), but these new associations usually involved
a much smaller number of residential units.  Increasingly, common property is set up to reduce
costs rather than to bring about a maintenance-free lifestyle.
7In addition, developers forning  associations began to respond  more to local government
regulations rather than to home-buyer preferences (Weiss and Watts 1989:21).  In some cases,
localities have refused to accept common areas and private streets within private developments.
In other situations, however, developers have found that-by  retaining control of a range of
infrastructure items such as streets, sewers, and utility lines-they  can reduce their costs below
what they would be if they constructed them according to public standards.  Thus developers
create the community associations to own and maintain private facilities in order to lower initial
costs, although maintenance and repair charges may be much higher in the long run.  One check
on this practice is the FHA, VA, Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association (Fannie Mac) requirement for properly organized
community associations to purchase mortgage loans.
Another development since World War II has been a proliferation of privately owned
streets and common areas in commercial districts. Before World War II, privately owned streets
in commercial districts were extremely uncommon.  Over the last forty years, however, private
ownership and operation of entire commercial districts (in the form of  shopping malls) has
become ubiquitous.  The entire property usually remains in the hands of one holder, with costs of
maintaining common areas, streets, and parking lots recompensed as part of the rental fees paid by
retail tenants.  As parking is usually free to customers, the result interestingly enough is that
infrastructure provision relies less, rather than more, on user fees than public streets with parking
meters.
Political and social factors may account for the continued growth of private associations.
Private ownership of common areas in shopping malls, as well as of residential streets, makes it
possible to control access and to exclude people or activities regarded as undesirable.  A number
of court decisions over the last half-century have resulted in greater protection for such activities
as circulating petitions, picketing and holding political demonstrations, and begging for money on
public streets and in public gathering places.  Such control has been an important (if difficult to
quantify incentive) for privatization, and issues of the character of public and political life and of
civil rights-as  well as of efficient service provision-are  raised by the increasing turn to private
streets.
Public transportation and transit
Few areas of infrastructure provision in the United States have undergone the massive
shifts of ownership and operation that characterized the public transportation sector, and
especially urban transit.  Public involvement in the supply of transportation facilities has had a
long history in this nation. In the first third of the nineteenth century, for instance, state
governments were especially active in providing capital for such transportation infrastructure as
canals, bridges, toll roads, and railroads.  These projects were either under state control or were
mixed enterprises, combining public and private construction and operation.  The motives for
these policies included promotional goals (social overhead capital), a desire for public profit,
concern over the limitations of private corporations, and the provision of employment. These
state public works projects reached a peak in the 1820s and 1830s, with sharp reductions in
spending after the depressions of 1837 and 1857 due to over-investment, high taxes and
corruption.  Thousands of miles of state-built canal systems were abandoned, other rights-of-way
8were turned over to private enterprise.  In a few cases state ownership continued.  At the same
time, however, a number of cities (such as Pittsburgh and Cinciimati) concerned about being
bypassed by private railroads being constructed, invested in railroad bonds in order to insure
access. In many cases, such investments turned out to be worthless (Tarr 1984b:7-9).
The era of major private construction and operation of municipal transit lines (as opposed
to intercity and regional connections) began in the 1850s and extended up through the post-World
War II period.  Private entrepreneurs and land speculators constructed many thousands of miles
of transit in large and small cities, operating under various forms of municipal charters and
franchises. They hoped to benefit from both fare revenue and from land speculation in areas
served by their lines. Public transit became steadily more capital intensive from 1850 to  1900,
shifting from horse-car lines to cable, and then to electric traction, but almost always remaining
private.
As cities grew more congested, however, and existing transit lines were unable to handle
increasing travel needs, demands rose for the construction of capital-intensive subway and rapid
transit lines. In major cities, private entrepreneurs were reluctant to assume the risk involved in
the large investments, and strict private ownership and operation become less common.  In
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, for instance, public transit commnissions  staffed by both
private and public representatives planned and built high speed lines financed and owned by the
city. The lines, however, were leased to private operators and the commissions retained
regulatory rights (Cheape 1980:100-1, 152-3, 206-7).
Beginning about 1910, however, transit lines in this country began to experience more and
more financial strain. The rise of the automobile as a competing form of transportation played an
important role but was only one of the reasons for their fiscal difficulties. Factors such as
overbuilding and heavy construction and maintenence costs were just as critical. Many lines were
constructed with the expectation of reaping windfall profits in real estate appreciation, and the
failure of these to materialize strained company finances. In addition,  the obligations transit lines
operated under in regard to street maintenance and fare restrictions and free transfer requirements
increased their fiscal burden (Cheape 1980:215-16).
In response to these problems, transit firms attempted to create a transit monopoly by
trading long term franchises for fare restrictions, meaning that the industry found itself in financial
trouble in inflationary periods.  Monopoly was not enough to guarantee survival, and transit
companies in cities such as Philadelphia and Boston, for instance, went into receivership by World
War I.  According to one source, about one-third of the transit industry was in bankruptcy by
1918. In some cases, such as Boston in 1918 and 1919, the two most important transit lines in
the state were put into the hands of public trustees who raised fares in an attempt to cover
expenses and who also authorized municipal subsidies for their operation.(Wohl 1982). More
customary, however, was streetcar company disinvestment in equipment and trackage.
Beginning in the 1920s, as the cost of the automobile declined and ownership spread,
public transit lines began to lose ridership and to suffer further financial damage.  Between 1940
and 1979, the net operating revenues for the transit industry dropped from a profit of $96 million
9to a deficit of $2,380 million (Wohl 1985).  Increasingly, the supply of transit became a
responsibility of public authorities rather than the private market.
Municipally  funded and owned subway systems first appeared in Boston in 1897, followed
in 1904 and 1932 in New York City, although in each case the lines were constructed and
operated by private companies. Almost all electric streetcar lines, bus lines, and elevated lines
(with the exception of those in San Francisco, Seattle, and Detroit), remained private until a shift
to public ownership began in the late 1940s. By 1948, although only 36 out of 1,400 transit
properties were publicly owned and operated, they were located in large cities such as Boston,
Chicago, Cleveland, New York and San Francisco, and represented about one-quarter of the
industry's operating revenues. The shift continued in the 1950s and the 1960s, with private
ownership declining from about 64 percent of urban transit systems in 1960 (cities over 50,000)
to just over 50 percent in 1978, although the publicly owned systems represented about 90
percent of the industry's patrons and operating revenues (CBO, 1988).
In 1964, Congress created the Urban Mass Transportation Administration and the federal
government became a major actor in the game of transit provision. Reflecting concern over the
loss of transit service in the urban core, the legislation authorized grants to modernize transit
systems in order to prevent their abandonment and to also reestablish them in the 105 cities that
had lost transit service between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s.  Initially, federal funds were
intended primarily  for purposes of preservation and renewal, but after 1971 federal aid was
available for new transit (Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez, 1981: 37-51).  Federal formula grants for
mass transit became available in 1974, and in 1982 a mass transit account was created in the
H4ighway  Trust Fund.  In spite of this infusion of funds, the number of transit riders nationally has
continued to decline as automobile usage increases for all types of trips (CBO,  1988: 31-3).
During the last decade, although publicly owned and subsidized transit systems continue
to dominate the field of urban transit, there have been several attempts at forms of privatization,
primarily in the area of bus services. A few private, unsubsidized firms operate in market niches
but the most common form of private involvement is contracting by governmental units with
private companies to provide drivers or special services. Under President Reagan, attempts were
made to spur privatization, and in 1984 the Federal Transit Administration issued a regulation
requiring public transit authorities receiving federal aid to advance privatization in various ways.
While contracting out for transportation services has increased somewhat, it still accounts for only
a small proportion of total operations and is customarily limited to specialized and supplementary
services (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1992: 5-1-7).
Waterworks
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, urban growth and the construction and
elaboration of networked systems of water supply and distribution have gone together in the
United States.  As the numbers of people living in cities increased, wells, cisterns, and other
alternate sources of water often proved vulnerable to contamination or simply too limited in
capacity to meet growing wants.  Popularization of new uses for water (such as the flush toilet)
increased the demand.  Waterworks also came to play increasingly  vital roles in protecting
urbanites against water-borne disease and their property against fire as cities increased in size. By
10the end of the nineteenth  century,  the availability  of clean,  low-cost, and abundant  supplies  of
piped-in  water had come to be widely  seen as a necessity  of urban  life in cities  throughout  the
United States.
Initially,  privately  owned  and operated  systems  predominated.  In 1800,  private  firms
owned  fifteen  out of the sixteen  waterworks  that had thus far been constructed  to serve  the few
and small  cities  of predominantly  rural  United  States. During  the years  that followed,  many  newly
settled  communities  granted franchises  to private  waterworks  firms. But as their populations
increased  and their areas expanded,  major cities  in the United  States consistently  tumed to direct
government  provision. The only breaks  in this trend came  during  periods like  that following  the
panic of 1873,  when state-imposed  restrictions  on municipal  authority  coincided  with a continued
demand  for water services  (Anderson  1980:104-6).  Overall,  the proportion  of government  owned
waterworks  in the United  States increased  from about 6 percent  in 1800  to about 53 percent in
1896. The trend was most pronounced  in rapidly  growing  urban centers. By 1896,  only nine  of
the largest fifty  cities  in the United  States still  relied  upon privately  owned  waterworks. By 1900,
all but one of the eleven  cities  in the United States  with a population  of more  than 300,000  had
acquired  or constructed  a municipally  owned  waterworks.
Selection  processes  for private  waterworks  firms,  details  of the contractual  or regulatory
regimes  under which  they operated,  and the scale  and duration  of private  waterworks
development  differed  substantially  from case  to case, as did the exact  circumstances  in which
individual  cities  turned to municipal  ownership.  But certain  consistent  themes  can be discerned.
As would  be expected  (given  the natural  monopoly  attributes  of water-supply  and distribution
facilities),  competition  between  operating  waterworks  firms  seldom  occurred,  even  in cases  in
which  there were no legal barriers  to entry. In a few cities,  a degree  of competition  for franchises
to build  and operate waterworks  facilities  did occur at the outset, but since  substantial
investments  in fixed  facilities  (such as water mains)  were required,  contracts  were typically  of
long-or  even indefinite-duration and recurrent  bidding  almost  never  took place.
In small  communities  in which  population  growth  was modest,  privately  owned  service
providers  and municipal  governments  sometimes  managed  to forge  viable  long-term  relationships
even  in the absence  of ongoing  competition  for franchises  and contracts. In the larger cities,
however,  as development  accelerated  and population  increased,  existing  physical  facilities  became
obsolete  and privately  owned service  providers  and municipal  governments  frequently  clashed
over questions  of new investments  and issues  of service  quality.
In regard to the critical  area of the provision  of water for fire protection,  the intractability
of the problems  under private  ownership  can be attributed  in great part to difficulties  in measuring
output and monitoring  quality. The "output,"  or amount  of fire protection,  actually  being
furnished  by a waterworks  depended  on a combination  of system  attributes  (including  the size and
layout  of the water mains,  the capacity  and condition  of pumps,  and the provisions  made for
reservoir  storage). In the early  decades  of the twentieth  century,  accurately  predicting  the actual
performance  of a waterworks  in the event of a major conflagration  required  careful  physical
inspection  and the exercise  of considerable  expertise  and  judgment  by highly  trained  engineers,
who had only an incomplete  knowledge  base to draw  upon (APWA  1925:72547). Even  when
problems  were identified,  lack of an easily  observed  and objectively  measured  standard  of
11performance made it difficult for a municipality  to impose sanctions on an errant waterworks firm
in an incremental and ongoing way.
Urban growth compounded the difficulties. Neither municipalities  nor waterworks firms
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries knew of a simple unit of output that could be
easily specified in a contract and used as a basis for proportionally compensating waterworks
firms for making the investments required to serve growing needs. Instead, parties with directly
opposing interests had to come to terms repeatedly over issues of waterworks design and quality
of service, as well as price, in order for privately owned service providers to be compensated for
investments in improvements.
Such commonly employed recourses as paying waterworks firms for each fire hydrant did
not obviate the need for such case-by-case negotiation and may have even worsened the
difficulties involved. The problem was that the number of fire hydrants contracted for by a city
bore little more than a coincidental relationship to the amount of fire protection actually received.
As a consequence, hydrant-based payment formulas provided little incentive for improvements in
fire protection no matter how generous the level of compensation set.  A water company, for
example, that replaced a system of four-inch water mains serving 400 hydrants (fed by unreliable
pumping stations) with a system of twelve-inch mains serving the same number of hydrants (fed
more reliably by gravity from high altitude reservoirs) would have received no additional
compensation for these investments under a per-hydrant payment formula and would therefore
have had no incentive for making such an investment.
As a result, even if a municipality  and a privately owned water company did manage to
negotiate a mutually acceptable price per hydrant and both sides sought to behave honorably in
living up to contract terms, conflicts could still easily arise. A municipality,  for example, might
complain of inadequate investment in new facilities as the demand for water for fire protection
increased, even as a privately owned water company expressed dissatisfaction at inadequate
compensation for those system improvements it did make. Both of the parties involved in such a
conflict, however, could reasonably believe themselves to be in the right (Wilcox 1915:23).
In the case of government-owned waterworks, by contrast, public officials could arrange
for construction of facilities serving specifically public and developmental needs without the sort
of difficult bargaining between parties with directly opposing interests required with private
ownership.  In addition, financing could easily be drawn from property tax revenues as well as
from user fees-a  recourse that made economic sense because of the ways in which
improvements in water supply and distribution facilities contributed to increased property values
and the provision of other public benefits, even for those who consumed relatively little water.
Although the exact arrangements vary from place to place, cities in the United States have
typically funded their waterworks through a combination of user fees, assessments on abutting
propertyholders for water-main extensions, and general tax revenues.
Despite these advantages, by almost any measure, government-owned waterworks did not
always perform perfectly. Numerous cases can be enumerated in which government as well as
privately owned waterworks scanted on investments in facilities needed to reduce the risk of fire
or protect the public health.  Ignorance and uncertainty took their toll-as  did institutional and
12bureaucratic infighting and simple incompetence. Overall, however, government-owned
waterworks in rapidly growing cities in the United States typically invested far more aggressively
in water supply and distribution facilities than had their privately owned counterparts.
Economists, particularly over the last thirty years, have criticized the eagerness on the part
of municipalities and other governmental entities to invest in large-scale water supply facilities on
efficiency grounds.  In particular, they have criticized as highly unrealistic assumptions that
demand for water is insensitive to price and that supplies of water must keep pace with population
and economic growth if a crisis is to be avoided. The result of rigid adherence to these
assumptions, these economists complain, is inefficiency  and waste as water supply facilities are
constructed at a marginal cost far in excess of any marginal benefits (Hirshleifer, De Haven, and
Milliman, 1960:347).
But despite these new conflicts, patterns of waterworks development established during
the nineteenth century have continued to the present day.  As in the past, government owned
systems continue to supply water to most of the urban and suburban areas in which the bulk of
America's people live. As of 1989, about three-quarters of the people in the United States served
by waterworks obtained their supplies from government-owned systems. The main changes
inspired by environmental and economic concerns have been with respect to the pricing of water.
Metering of water has increased, markets for bulk supplies are being established in water-short
regions such as California, and efforts are under way in a variety of locales to reduce subsidies
and bring prices more in line with marginal costs.
Privately owned waterworks have not completely disappeared from the American scene.
As of 1977, about 44 percent of American waterworks were owned by private firms.  Twelve
years later, 58 percent of the nation's 59,621 water systems were owned and operated by private
firms.  Several of these systems are quite large and serve heavily populated areas.  Examples
include the Elizabethtown and Hackensack water companies in suburban New Jersey. Large,
privately owned systems are most common in heavily populated suburban areas carved up into
small political jurisdictions, for which individual  waterworks would be impracticable. They
represent a vehicle for regional service delivery. Most of the thousands of privately owned
systems now operating in the United States, however, are quite diminutive, serving small
municipalities, unincorporated patches of metropolitan areas, or even single real estate
developments. Approximately 60,000 of America's community water systems, for instance serve
less than 2.7 percent of the population.  In addition, about 40 million people draw their drinking
water from private wells (OTA, 1987:157-8).
As in the past, government-owned systems continue to supply water to the urban and
suburban areas in which the bulk of America's people live. As of 1989, about 71 percent of the
people in the United States served by waterworks obtained their supplies from 26,000 publicly
owned systems. A few very large community water operations (0.5 percent of the total) served
more than 43 percent of the population (OTA 1991:138-39). In contrast, about 13 percent of the
population drew their water supplies from 16,000 privately owned utilities (National Foundation
on Public Works Improvements, February 1988:54).
Sewerage systems and waste water treatment
13Like the waterworks  with which  they are often associated,  systems  of piped sewerage  in
the United  States have  typically  been  funded  by a combination  of user fees, assessments  on
abutting  property  holders,  and general  tax revenues. To an even  greater extent  than in
waterworks,  flat fees and assessments  remain  common  and metering  of flows,  at.least  from small
customers,  is virtually  unknown. Unlike  the case  for waterworks,  privately  owned centralized
systems  of piped sewerage  have  never  been common  in the United States. Where  such
arrangements  have  been employed,  it has usually  been in "company  towns" (such as Pullman
Illinois  during  the late nineteenth  century  or Vandergrift,  Pennsylvania),  in which  most or all of
the land  and structures are owned  by an individual  propertyholder.
Disposal  of waste  water and sewage  in'  the United  States has not always  been  a
government  responsibility.  Where  centralized  sewerage  systems  have not been in place,  an array
of arrangements  for the provision  of service  have  been  found. Originally,  human  wastes, used
water, and solid wastes  in most American  urban centers  were disposed  of privately  and locally  in
cesspools,  privy  vaults, or even  in street gutters. Some  public  and private  underground  sewers
existed  in larger cities  such  as New York,  Baltimore  and Boston, but these were intended  for
stormwater  drainage  from streets rather than for human  waste removal. By the 1820s  and 1830s,
most large cities  had instituted  periodic  vault emptying  by private  scavengers  under city  contract
or by city employees.  In many  cases,  cities  see-sawed  between  the use of municipal  employees
and private  contractors  with satisfaction  proving  elusive  under  either arrangement  (Tarr,
1984a:228-39).
Problems  arose  in considerable  part because  of inadequacies  in cesspool  and privy  vault
arrangements  themselves  as cities  grew in size and density. The adoption  of urban  water systems
increased  the stress on the cesspool  and privy-vault  system. Different  options  were tried to solve
the problem  but eventually  most major  cities  adopted  the so-called  water carriage,  or sewerage,
system  (Tarr et. al. 1984a). Construction  of municipal  sewerage  systems  during  the middle  and
later years of the nineteenth  century  was linked  to a more general  movement  away  from a
piecemeal,  decentralized  approach  to city  building. The goal  was a technical  system  that was
sanitary  and self-activating.  Where  private  systems  serving  single  streets or groups  of houses
existed,  they were generally  integrated  into the municipal  system  to prevent  pollution  or
eliminated  entirely  (Peterson 1979:94-6).
During  the twentieth  century,  centralized  sewerage  systems  have come  to play  an
increased  role in many  suburban  as well  as urban  areas, although  septic  tanks and cesspools  are
still  employed  in some  suburban  locales. In general,  construction  of sewerage  systems  can be
seen as a success  in that they removed  sanitary  nuisances  and health  threats  from urban areas.
Pollution  was not eliminated,  however,  but was merely  sent somewhere  else (Tarr 1984a:236-39).
By the first and second decades  of the twentieth  century,  much  technical  knowledge  existed  as to
how to reduce  pollution  impacts,  and some  sewage  treatment  plants  were actually  built. But
investment  was limited  and enormous  volumes  of raw or minimally  treated wastes  were dumped
into the country's  streams  and rivers.
The last three decades  in the United  States have seen  the emergence  of a national  effort  to
tackle the problem. Federal and state  water pollution  standards  have  been  tightened. Equally  (if
not more) importantly,  under the terms of the Water  Pollution  Control  Act Amendments  of 1972,
14the federal government began to provide municipalities  with 75 percent of the money needed to
plan and build waste treatment plants.  From 1972 through 1984, more than $40 billion was spent
by the federal government on the program with about 17,000 grants being made (Helman and
Johnson 1992:36).  From 1976 through 1986, the proportion of the population of the United
States served by waste water treatment facilities increased from about 67 to 75 percent (Helman
and Johnson 1992:4  1). During the 1980s, however, concern that some projects have been
overbuilt and "gold-plated" and the belief that waste water treatment was primarily a local and
state responsibility led to cutbacks in federal spending.  Some federal role in financing projects has
continued, but under the terms of the Water Quality Act of 1987, this is expected to end in 1994.
Many industrial plants in the United States treat their own effluent, but like the sewage
systems to which they are appended, almost all waste water treatment plants in the United States
serving municipalities  are themselves government-owned.  A few cities, however, have chosen to
have private firms own or operate treatment facilities. Reasons given for engaging in such
arrangements included advantageous tax changes during the early and middle years of the 1980s
and lower costs and presumed greater efficiency  of the private sector, due to the ability of private
firms to profit by cutting costs.  Roles played by competition in deciding upon the service
provider and terms of contracts themselves have varied.  In Aubur,  Alabama, for example, the
city formally evaluated proposals by four national firms and construction, ownership, and
operation were carried through by the winning firm under the terms of a twenty-five-year
contract, under which the city paid the contractor an operations and maintenance fee. In Mount
Vernon, Illinois, by contrast, ownership has remained in the hands of the municipality,  with a
private firm upgrading and operating the existing facility in return for a fee adjusted for inflation
and volume of effluent processed (Helman and Johnson 1992:133-5).
The 1980 census showed that approximately 80 percent of the U.S. population was served
by central sewer systems, a percentage rise of 5 percent compared to the 1970 census, although
the actual number of dwellings not served by central systems is actually increasing ("Project
Summary: A Statistical Abstract of the Unsewered U.S. Population," USEPA. April 1988:S5-87).
The absence of central sewerage systems is most common in rural and urban-fringe growth areas.
These areas are largely served by private on-site systems such as septic tanks, although new
technologies such as holding tanks and mounds are slowly advancing. Individual onsite septic
systems, while often inexpensive and cost-effective, have frequent system failure and frequently
create pollution problems. Maintenance and emptying of the facility, as well as transportation and
disposal of the wastes, is the responsibility of the private homeowner. States and counties often
do not rigorously enforce local sanitation and land-use codes in regard to these systems, creating
potentially hazardous situations (OTA 1991:155).
The collection and disposal of garbage and solid wastes
The systematic collection and disposal of solid wastes and garbage by either public or
private groups-that  is, of various forms of refuse that result from society's daily activities-is
primarily a phenomena of the past century or so.  Even though there were a few municipal
ordinances enacted before the Civil War, in most cities the streets were considered legitimate
receptacles for household refuse.  It was customary in Chicago, Cincinnati, New York, and
southern cities for various types of animals (such as pigs, vultures, or even cows) to act as
15scavengers, consuming the various wastes discarded on the street by householders (Armstrong
1976: 433). Even though some larger cities, such as New York, experimented with more
systematic collection at mid-century, it was not until the rapid urbanization and large increases in
the volume of wastes of the late-nineteenth century that more systematic methods of collection
were widely considered. The question of whose responsibility waste collection and disposal was a
primary matter of dispute.
Historically, three types of approaches were, and have been, generally followed in the
administration of the collection of garbage: municipal collection and disposal by a city
department; collection and disposal by private contractors under contract with the city; and
separate or private arrangements by householders with contractors or scavengers. However, over
time, various combinations also evolved, including municipal and private, municipal and contract,
municipal, contract, and private, and contract and private (APWA 1958:271-74).  All private
contractors were expected to follow the terms of their contracts and to abide by municipal
sanitary rules, although there were frequent failures in this regard. Private failure to satisfy
municipal contract rules and expectations explains, as it did with waterworks, the movement
toward municipal service provision, although there are significant  differences in the timing of the
change.
Once garbage collection was accepted as a desirable municipal service, cities attempted to
accomplish it primarily through private contractors.  From 1880 to 1899, for instance, the number
of cities who contracted for garbage collection increased from 19 percent to 46 percent, while
municipal collection increased from 24 percent to 32 percent.  Yet private arrangements dropped
from 30 percent in 1880 to 3 percent in 1899 (Melosi 1981:154).  The motivation for reliance
upon contracting rather than municipal operations is probably explained by the absence of a clear
rationale for government involvement-as  occurred in the cases of waterworks, sewerage, police,
and fire services, all of  which were perceived as involving the public health and safety.  There
was also considerable opposition to government operation in a domain with a substantial set of
private operators, as well as municipal opposition to making the necessary capital outlays (Hering
and Greeley 1921:156).
During the decade of the 1880s, however, the collection of garbage was increasingly
viewed as involving more than the collection of wastes in order to avoid nuisance. A majority of
late-nineteenth century physicians  and sanitation experts, who believed in the so-called
"anticontagionist" theory, emphasized the need for the rapid disposal of organic wastes (such as
sewage or food) to prevent the occurrence of epidemic-producing miasmas. Just as cities had
moved from private to public provision of municipal  water supplies because of concerns over the
inability of the private sectors to provide for adequate fire and public health protection, they
began to question leaving solid waste removal in the hands of private contractors (Melosi 1992:4-
6).
Their concerns were exacerbated by the chaos that characterized this urban service, with
frequent changes of venders, the wide-spread use of short-term contracts in the attempt to raise
performance standards, and a reluctance on the part of contractors to invest in improved capital
equipment. Reformers in the late-nineteenth century concluded that sanitation was too important
an urban function to be left in the hands of profit-motivated contractors.  They also argued that
16municipal operation of waste collection could develop the economies of scale (Hering and
Greeley, 1921:155-6).
The late 1  890s and the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore, saw cities shifting
from reliance upon private contracting for garbage collection to a system of municipal collection
and disposal. This trend continued until well after World War II, with municipal collection alone
or municipal collection combined with some private contracting serving over 60 percent of the
cities (the data is imprecise) while contracting alone shrank to below 30 percent (Melosi
1981:154; APWA 1958:274).  Initially garbage collection and disposal was the domain of
departments of public health, but as the germ-theory of disease replaced anti-contagionism among
public health physicians and practitioners, control over the function shifted to public works
departments.  Garbage collection was increasingly  viewed as an engineering rather than a public
health problem but was still a governmental responsibility. Municipalities now focused on
preventing solid wastes and garbage from creating nuisances (smells, flies, fire hazards, etc.)
rather than health hazards.
Municipal control of solid waste and garbage collection and disposal continued to increase
through the 1950s, although many large cities (such as Kalamazoo, Oakland, Portland, San
Francisco, and Seattle) used either the contract system or permitted private arrangements (APWA
1958: 273-74).  After the late 1950s, however,  municipal collection began to decline, and private
contracting increased.  One factor accounting for the change was the rise of large firms who
bought up smaller companies throughout the country in the waste collection area.  These
agglomerates were able to provide economies of scale, sophisticated management techniques, and
efficient collection practices.  Other factors included concern over waste-disposal methods and
sites because of new environmental regulations and a sharp rise in the costs of disposal as weli as
a desire to shift labor and operating costs to the private sector.  By the 1980s, private contracting
was on the rise with a consensus emerging among students of the area that contracting was the
most cost effective method of delivering the service (Donahue 1989:58-68)
Electric utilities
Unlike the case of the infrastructures previously described, electric utility service to
private consumers has always been funded almost entirely by user fees.  Some interesting
contractual issues have arisen in the provision of specifically  public goods (such as street lighting),
but typically, municipalities have paid for these and other public services on the basis of fee
structures not dramatically different than those used by ordinary consumers.  As in waterworks,
private ownership predominated during the early years of electric utilities.  Over time, a few large
cities (such as Seattle, Los Angeles, and Cleveland) did turn to government ownership.  But in
sharp contrast to the case in waterworks, private firms have mostly retained their hold in densely
populated urban areas, and such government ownership as there is can be mostly found in small
cities and rural areas (except for the TVA).  While there are about 3,500 separate electric systems
in the United States, the largest 200 account for "almost 90 percent of the industry's generating
capacity and directly serve nearly 80 percent of the industry's ultimate customer load" (Phillips
1984:583).  Today as in the past, most consumers in the United States obtain their electricity from
large, vertically integrated, privately-owned service providers.
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States simply  performed  far better than their  waterworks  counterparts  in serving  public  and
private  needs. One  reason for this relatively  good performance  is that arranging  for provision  of
specifically  public  goods (such as street lighting)  did not present  the sorts of contracting
difficulties  that so bedeviled  relationships  between  municipalities  and privately  owned  water
companies. As with water for fire protection,  municipalities  and privately  owned suppliers  of
electric  street lighting  often  found themselves  enmeshed  in long-term  relationships,  even  when
short  term contracts  with provisions  for competitive  bidding  were employed. These relationships
were not always  entirely  peaceable.  But under contractual  arrangements  little different  from those
fbr water for fire protection,  municipal  governments  and privately  owned  service  providers  found
it possible  to arrange  for service  quality  to be maintained  and increases  in demand  accommodated
with relatively  little difficulty  and conflict  (Jacobson 1989:54-5).
Ease in measuring  output and monitoring  quality  accounted  for the difference.  Unlike  the
case of water for fire protection,  the output of public  illumination  being  furnished  by a privately
owned service  provider  could  be specified  with reasonable  precision  in terms of a readily
observable  and easily  measured  unit-the  number  of street lamps  operating  on a given  night. At
the same  time,  the quality  of the illumination  being  furnished  could be discerned  with the naked
eye and easily  monitored  on a day-to-day  basis, at least in a gross  way, by policemen  and even
ordinary  citizens  reporting  lamp  outages.  Poor quality  or unreliable  service  was not only
immediately  and indisputably  apparent  to municipal  officials  and members  of the public  but could
be easily  sanctioned  in an incremental  and ongoing  way, through  simple  contract terms that set a
penalty  for each  lamp outage  (Boston  Lamp Department  1891:5).
In addition,  even  massive  increases  in demand  for street lighting  could be accommodated
without having  to renegotiate  the terms of the simple  per-lamp  pricing  structures  employed.  The
number  of street lamps operating  in a city  was a fairly  good index  of the actual output of public
illumination  being  furnished. At times,  disputes  broke out between  cities  and electric  utility  firms
over what constituted  a fair price per lamp  as costs of labor  and material  changed,  technology
improved,  and economies  of scale  increased. But, so long as the price per lamp remained  at a
level  equal to or higher  than average  costs, even  the most opportunistic  and unprincipled  purveyor
of electric  street lighting  services  would  have  been foolish  either  to refuse  to accommodate
growing  demand  (for which  it would  be rewarded)  or to skimp  on quality  of service  (for which  it
would  be easily  caught  and penalized,  Jacobson 1989:68-73).
Market  forces also played  a major role in spurring  electric  utility  firms  to furnish  good
quality  service  to all consumers  and to pursue aggressive  marketing  and investment  policies.
Particularly  during  the early  years  of the industry,  electric  utility  entrepreneurs  faced an
unpredictable  competitive  environment  rich with opportunities  to lose as well  as to make money.
Limited  economies  of scale  coupled  with public  policies  designed  to encourage  competition  lay at
the root of much of this insecurity. Because  the voltage of the direct  current  used by lighting
companies  during  the 1880s  and early 1890s  could  not be easily  stepped  up or down to match  the
requirements  of consumers,  different  types of generators  had to be used for different  kinds of
consumption.  Arc lights  (used for street lighting  and other large spaces),  incandescent  light (used
in homes  and offices),  and traction  uses each had to be supplied  by different  sets of wires and
generating  units. In the incandescent  lighting  and small  power  markets,  economies  of scale  were
18further limited by the small size of the distribution areas that could be served by the low voltages
of the direct current systems developed by Thomas Edison (Platt 1991:22-39).
At the same time, municipalities in the United States typically issued non-exclusive
franchises to electric utility firms, which neither imposed significant constraints with respect to
price or quality of service to private consumers nor furnished a significant  degree of protection
against competition.  So long as such policies remained in place, the small size of generating
facilities combined with the relatively low cost of stringing wire as compared to laying pipe meant
that risks to incumbent firms from duplicative competition were far greater in electric utilities than
in waterworks. Although episodes of competition rarely persisted for long, price wars and costs
incurred in buying out competitors could result in significant financial strains on privately owned
service providers.  In addition, even when electric utility firms succeeded (as they usually did) in
repealing threats posed by duplicative competition through merger or other means, they still had
to compete for market share with entrenched gas utility firms and large consumers who generated
their own electricity (Passer 1953).
To survive, let alone grow, in the face of these varied competitive threats, electric utility
firms had to furnish a product of high reliability  and to keep costs as low as possible.  Competitive
vulnerabilities arising from limitations on economies of scale also helped to spur technological
change.  Only by overcoming constraints on scale economies could electric utility entrepreneurs
profitably expand their businesses and conquer new markets.  During the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, some of the most brilliant inventors and best-organized research and
development enterprises devoted themselves to attacking the technological obstachles that lay in
the way of generating, transmitting, and distributing large outputs of electricity at a low price.
A crucial first step, the introduction by Westinghouse of single phase altemating current,
came during the late 1880s. The major advantage of Westinghouse's innovation over the direct
current generated by Edison plants was that voltage could be easily stepped up for economical
transmission and then stepped down again for use by customers. This meant that individual
alternating current generating plants did not have to be built adjacent to major centers of demand
in order for a large area to be served. Over the course of the 1890s, the introduction of such
innovations as polyphase altemating current made it possible for altemating current to be used for
an increasing variety of purposes such as running motors and energizing arc lights. At the same
time, rotary converters made it possible for independently constructed direct and alternating
current networks to be fed off the same generating plant.  Largely in place by the first decade of
the twentieth century, these advances laid the technological groundwork for enormous growth in
the electric utility industry in coming years and reduced vulnerability to many forms of
competition (Wittig 1930:82-92).
Over time, technologically based increases in economies of scale rendered entry by new
electric utility firms more difficult  while encouraging mergers between existing companies so as to
avoid large scale, expensive, and unprofitable duplication of expensive capital investments in
generation and distribution facilities (Hughes 1983:106-39).  Price reductions made possible by
improved economies of scale (as well as technological improvements in lamp efficiencies)
gradually reduced the competitive threat to electric utilities from gas companies as well. Although
gas lighting remained in use by many domestic consumers well into the second decade of the
19twentieth century, the costs of electric street lighting had been so reduced by 1900 that
competition from gas companies for street lighting business had virtually disappeared. In a few
cities, mergers between gas and electric companies eliminated this competition altogether (Passer
1953:70, 206).
Nevertheless, powerful forms of market discipline on electric utility firms remained.  Until
the mid-  1960s, capacity use needs and growth in economies of scale have continued to provide
incentives for electric utility firms to provide high quality and reliable service and to extend their
networks aggressively and develop new markets.  Because electric utilities could not store
significant amounts of power for future use, maintaining the ratio of average to peak consumption
(load factor) at a high level was, and is, of critical importance for utilities to obtain a high level of
remuneration from their increasingly  large-scale and expensive capital facilities.
At least in densely populated urban areas, these forms of market discipline meant that
protection of consumer interests never depended upon the efficacy  of franchising and regulatory
arrangements in electric utilities to nearly the same extent as in waterworks.  As in other
infrastructures, exact forms taken by these arrangements differed from case to case but certain
common themes and trends can be discerned. In many although not all states, municipal
franchising of private electric utilities was partially or entirely supplanted by state regulation
during the first two decades of the twentieth century.  By 1935, regulatory commissions usually
appointed by governors and possessing the authority to set rates and to protect electric utility
firms against duplicative competition had been put in place in thirty seven states and the District
of Columbia. In most cases, the political coalition supporting imposition of regulation included
both good-government reformers and utility executives. For reformers, regulation represented a
solution to problems of municipal  corruption.  For utility executives, state regulation represented
a means to stave off more stringent municipal ownership and regulatory initiatives and gain legal
protection against even the threat of duplicative competition (Anderson 1981:56).
In practice, state regulators generally did not constrain decisionmaking by privately owned
service providers in significant  ways.  In nearly all states, commissions could not begin cases on
their own initiative. In the context of declining costs that characterized the industry, the high
costs of initiating and carrying through a complaint worked to the advantage of utility firms
(Mosher 1929:19-20).  Other constraints faced by regulatory commissions included inadequate
staffing; lack of jurisdiction over wholesale interstate power sales; and the likelihood of disruptive,
time-consuming, and inconsistent judicial intervention for any regulatory decision opposed by
utility firms.
Significant  federal involvement in the affairs of private utility firms was initiated during the
mid-1930s amidst economic depression and efforts by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to reforn
the distribution of economic and political power and stimulate the economy. With respect to
private electric utilities in particular, the main impetus for regulatory reform came from concern
about financial abuses on by holding companies and undue and unaccountable concentrations of
power in the hands of those who controlled them.  In response to perceived abuses, legislation
enacted in 193  5 gave the Federal Power Commission authority to regulate wholesale prices for
electricity marketed across state lines. At the same time, the Securities and Exchange
Commission was given the authority to regulate holding companies' ability to issue securities, to
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operating companies at cost.  Most importantly, the law mandated outright dismemberment for
holding companies that did not serve geographically unified areas (Twentieth-Century Fund
1948:43).  Unlike the case with the state regulation described previously, these reforms were
carried through over the strenuous opposition of the private electric utility industry.  Although a
few regional holding companies survived, federal interventions left the United States with an
electric utility industry consisting predominantly of independent, vertically integrated private
firms.
Expansionary electric utility development of the sort that had first accelerated during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reached its high mark in the United States during the
two decades following World War II.  Technological improvements in the generation and
transmission of electricity continued to lower the cost of generating and transmitting electricity.
At the same time, despite The New Deal reforms of the 193  Os, neither federal nor state regulatory
commissions exercised rigid control over rates of return earned by private electric utility firms or
offered much oversight.
Under predominantly private rather than government ownership, expansionary
development of electric utilities, like that of waterworks, became increasingly controversial from
the late 1960s onward.  Unlike the case during previous eras of controversy, the most heated
debates now centered not on which form of ownership or regulation represented the best means
of maximizing the production and consumption of electricity but on the desirability of this goal.
With the rise of environmentalism,  many people would come to see continued growth in the use
of energy not as enhancing human welfare but as dangerous to public health and irrational in
environmental terms (De Bell 1970:66).  As in waterworks, assumptions that unlimited growth
was desirable in the power sector also began to come under criticism on economic grounds
(Energy Policy Project 1974:325-43, Lovins, 1977).
Pursuit of traditional growth paths by electric utilities also became more difficult during
the late 1960s because there were fewer incremental advances in generating technology of the
kind that had brought about steady increases in efficiency  over the previous fifty years.  Efforts to
lower costs through exploitation of scale economies also proved increasingly difficult as large new
plants proved more costly to build and less reliable than expected.  The problems arising from
scaling up were particularly severe with respect to nuclear power plants but bedeviled
conventional thermal facilities as well (Hirsh 1989:89-142). The combined result of soaring rates
of inflation and exploding energy costs during the 1970s was that, after years of decline, the
average and marginal cost of generating electricity began to increase.  In large part as a result of
these shocks, growth in electricity consumption in the United States during the 1970s was less
than half that of previous decades.  Energy prices as a whole stabilized during the 1980s and oil
prices actually fell, but average rates of growth in the consumption of electricity continued in the
range of two to three percent a year (Moody's 1992a:22).
Despite all of these shocks and controversies, proportions of private and government
ownership in the electric utility industry have remained more or less the same since the 1930s.
But roles played by the government and by markets have both increased in certain respects.
During the 1970s and 1980s, environmental concerns would be translated into increased
21regulation over pollution discharges. Government involvement in the siting of facilities also
increased (Hirsh 1989:151).  In many states, shifts from declining to rising costs raised the
political profile of electric utility issues and inspired unprecedented activism on the part of
regulatory commissions in pursuing their traditional oversight fimctions with respect to rates and
service (Anderson 1981). Since the late 1970s, federal legislation has also played a role.  Laws
enacted in 1978 and 1992 have mandated that states take into account principles of marginal cost
pricing and least-cost planning in carrying through their own regulatory activities.
At the same time, efforts have been under way to restructure the electric utility industry
itself along more competitive lines. Here, too, it has been federal legislation that has been the
driving force.  The Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 required utility firms to buy
electricity from small, unregulated, independent cogenerating plants and facilities that relied on
renewable resources.  The initiative was justified on both environmental and energy conservation
grounds.  The Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act enacted into law in 1992 extended
these principles still further.  Largely motivated by a desire to increase competition in the electric
utility industry, the act reduces regulatory restrictions on independent power producers of all sorts
and increases the authority of federal regulators to order access to utility transmission facilities
(Rosenzwig 1993:17).
Most electricity in the United States continues to be furnished by vertically integrated,
privately owned utilities enjoying a monopoly over distribution in their service areas.  As a result
of these acts, however, independent nonutility firms have begun to generate a significant  portion
of the country's electricity and bulk power markets have increased in importance.  A number of
conflicts emerged over the terms of these arrangements over the course of the 1980s. In general,
for example, independent generators sought to promote a regulatory regime in which both access
to transmission lines was as open as possible and privately owned utilities were compelled to bind
themselves to the purchase of power from the independents under long-term contracts.  Privately
owned utilities, by contrast, often (although not always) sought to keep as much control as
possible over their transmission facilities and opposed requirements to purchase power from
independents under long-term contracts.  While independents relied upon such contracts to ensure
that their investments would be recompensed, many utilities claimed that they reduced flexibility.
Even if the independent generator had an initial cost advantage, many utilities claimed, changing
conditions sometimes resulted in their being forced to purchase power at higher costs than
generating it themselves (Jordan 1991, Swidler 1991).
Telephones
The history of telephone service in the United States both parallels and diverges from that
of electric utilities in some interesting ways. Both industries began during the late nineteenth
century and, as from the beginning in electric utilities, service to private consumers has been
recompensed almost entirely by user fees.  Over the course of the twentieth century, telephone as
well as electric utility networks have come to encompass the entire country, as technological
improvements in both industries made for enormous declines over time in the real costs of
providing service. From the mid 1930s to the mid 1980s, for example, the number of
simultaneous conversations that could be carried over a single coaxial cable increased from less
than 500 to over 32,000.  Beginning in the late 1940s, the development of microwave relay
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the recent development of fiber-optic technology.  At the same time, deployment of switching
systems of increasing sophistication has dramatically  lowered the costs of routing calls and
increased the range of communication services that can be furnished over the network.
But there are also differences. From the beginning, dominance by privately owned service
providers has been even greater in telephones than in electric utilities. To a far greater extent than
in electric utilities, development of telephone networks has involved coordination of investment
and operation on a national and even international scale, resulting in a different organization of the
industry. In electric utilities, over time, vertically integrated privately owned service providers
operating on a local, and eventually regional, scale have furnished the bulk of service. In
telephones, by contrast, a single firm has dominated virtually from the beginning.
From almost the start of the industry until 1984, the bulk of the local and long-distance
telephone service in the United States was furnished by the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company. By the last decades of the nineteenth century, the firmns  management had succeeded in
parlaying its access to large pools of capital and early control of the Bell telephone patents into a
position as the supplier of the bulk of the local and long-distance telephone service in the United
States.  After expiration of the Bell patents in 1893, a large number of independent telephone
companies were founded in both urban and rural areas.  But with the help of its control of long
distance lines and superior resources, Bell was able to buy out or eliminate most competitors in
major centers by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century (Garnet 1985:131).  This
dominant position was maintained in subsequent years, and AT&T became the largest corporation
in the United States.
The telephone company, like its electric utility counterparts, would come under the
jurisdiction of state regulatory commissions  during the first and second decades of the twentieth
century.  But to a greater extent than in electric utilities, provision of service involved transactions
that crossed state lines. As a consequence, federal involvement started earlier, beginning in 1910
with enactment of the Mann-Elkins Act, which gave the Interstate Commerce Commission
jurisdiction over prices charged for interstate and international telephone and telegraph and cable
services.  In practice, during the early years of its jurisdiction, the ICC made minimal efforts to set
or control rates, but it did make valuation studies and set up a uniform system of accounts.
As in electric utilities, Depression-era reforms brought about more extensive federal
involvement. In particular, the framework of rate regulation was elaborated more fully after
passage of the Federal Communications Act in 1934. The act placed regulation of interstate
telephone service under the jurisdiction of a newly established Federal Communications
Commission (FCC).  The commission pursued a detailed investigation of the costs of telephone
service and established a framework of continuing surveillance for setting future rate levels by
informal negotiations. But unlike the case of electric utilities, the federal government did not
order a restructuring of the industry at this time.  The rationale seems to have been that the
telephone network was functionally integrated on a national scale in a way that the electric utility
holding companies were not (Phillips 1988:677-756).
23Nevertheless, from early in the twentieth century, the dominance of American Telephone
and Telegraph was attacked as representing an undue and unaccountable concentration of political
as well as economic power.  These attacks were not entirely without effect, and during the early
decades of the twentieth century, legal action centered mainly on efforts to prevent American
Telephone and Telegraph from buying out or destroying independent local service providers.  In
response to an early antitrust suit, for example, in 1913 American Telephone and Telegraph
agreed to give small independent telephone companies access to its long-distance network  and
promised not to acquire competing firms (Garnet 1985:153-54). The Hall Memorandum, signed
in 1922, reinforced these commitments, although by this date American Telephone and
Telegraph's dominance in major population centers was secure.
Since World War II, legal and governmental action has centered on efforts to increase
competition in those areas of the telephone industry in which economic considerations do not
justify monopoly. In 1949, the federal government filed a civil antitrust suit calling for American
Telephone and Telegraph and its equipment manufacturing subsidiary Western Electric to be split
up.  At least in theory, such a split would result in increased competition in the  equipment
manufacturing market and ultimately more choice and lower costs for consumers.  The suit was
settled in 1956 with an agreement by American Telephone and Telegraph to pursue a more liberal
policy in licensing patents.  The company was also restricted from entering non common carrier
telephone businesses. Otherwise, however, the settlement left American Telephone and
Telegraph intact.
More radical change occurred in subsequent years.  During the 1960s and 1970s, new
technologies such as microwave transmission made it possible for firms to compete for long-
distance business at relatively low cost.  American Telephone and Telegraph continued to furnish
almost all long-distance service, but over time, a series of FCC decisions began to reduce legal
barriers to entry, and competing firms such as MCI began to provide service in a few markets.
Settlement of a civil antitrust suit filed by the federal government in 1974 ended American
Telephone and Telegraph's monopoly in long-distance markets entirely.  Settlement of the suit
approved in 1982 broke the links between American Telephone and Telegraph's long-distance and
local operations.  Still regarded as a natural monopoly, local telephone service contiriued to be
carried by regional companies. Long-distance markets, on the other hand, were opened to
competition, and since divestiture in 1984, some competition has emerged in long-distance
markets, as expected.  Interestingly, this has taken place in a context of continued judicial and
regulatory restraint on American Telephone and Telegraph designed to prevent the firm from
using its existing dominance to crush new competitors through aggressive pricing or other means
(Phillips 1988:677-756).
Technological developments during recent years, such as the development of cellular and
other wireless systems of telephony, seem to be increasing potential for competition for local
telephone service.  Thus far, at least, effects have been limited and the vast majority of telephone
calls are still carried through the lines and switches of the existing network.  Future developments,
of course, are uncertain. Based upon existing experiences, however, it is likely that changes in
technology alone may be insufficient to sustain higher levels of competition in the future.
Restrictions on mergers of competing firms may be needed as well  as requirements for network
access in order to prevent new competitors from being frozen out by incumbent firms
24Comparative  analysis:  Great  Britain  and France
Extended discussion of infrastructure developments in Great Britain, France, and other
countries lies beyond the scope of this report.  But even brief examinations of the histories of a
few infrastructures in different countries  can shed light on some of the ways in which ideas,
institutions, and attributes of infrastructures themselves have shaped choice and functioning of
forms of ownership. As in the United States, the sheer range and variety of arrangements
employed at different times and places has been enormous.
In general, government ownership has been the dominant approach in the United States
and throughout the world for infrastructures (such as roads and streets) for which user fees are
seldom charged. For infrastructures in which service providers are commonly recompensed all or
in part by user fees (such as telecommunications networks, waterworks, and electric utilities) the
range of variation is greater.  While provision of telegraph as well as telephone service in the
United States has always been provided by privately owned firms, for example, state ownership
has predominated in France, Germany, Switzerland, and other European countries. Decisions as
to development as well as ownership of these systems in many cases was also shaped to a much
greater extent in Europe than in the United States by considerations of national unity and military
need  (Holcombe 1911; de Gournay 1988:322-38).
With respect to waterworks and electricity, in Great Britain (as in the United States at the
outset of the twentieth century) oversight and direct provision of many infrastructures lay in the
hands of a complex web of entrenched local municipalities  and authorities. But unlike the United
States, Great Britain was and is a unitary state.  In the British context, this has meant that, with
some exceptions, a ruling party in the House of Commons could make decisions concerning the
provision of infrastructures virtually unchallenged by independent courts, executives, or other
legislative bodies.  Until the 1980s, this power was generally applied to create public bodies that
could break through jurisdictional barriers to the exploitation of scale economies in the provision
of infrastructures.  As in the United States, a majority of Great Britain's urban population obtained
their water from government-owned systems during the first decades of the twentieth century,
although a few private companies owned and operated systems under monopoly franchises. Since
World War II, however, involvement by the national government in organizing the industry has
been substantially greater in Britain than in the United States.  A National Water Act passed in
1945 provided inducements for municipal and local systems to amalgamate for the purpose of
increasing efficiency. Under the terms of the Act, the number of separate water supply systems in
England and Wales was reduced from 1,400 during World War II to 187 in 1974.
New legislation enacted in 1973 in England and Wales brought about massive
consolidation of the provision of both water and sewerage services. On the rationale that
conservation and environmental protection needs at the outset of the twentieth century required
planning and decisionmaking that took into account the requirements of entire regions and
watersheds, management of the country's government-owned waterworks and sewage systems
was placed in the hands of ten regional water authorities. In addition to provision of water and
sewerage services, the water boards were also given responsibility for administering pollution
control regulations.  Under this regime, during the 1980s, individual metering of households
began for the first time in Britain.  Criticisms of the arrangement included claims that waterworks
25investment  remained  inadequate  (due to public  sector borrowing  limits)  and charges  that placing
environmental  regulation  in the hands of service  providers  made  for inadequate  checks  on the
power of system  managers  (Maclean  1991:37-54).
In electric  utilities  as well,  extensions  of government  ownership  and the breaching  of
jurisdictional  barriers  to exploitation  of economies  of scale  went hand in hand. From the
beginning,  a far greater proportion  of British  than American  municipalities  established  their own
electric  utility  undertakings.  From 1900  through 1948,  municipal  undertakings  accounted  for a
two-thirds  share  of all electric  utility  sales  in Great Britain. Municipalities  dominated  in densely
populated  urban  centers,  while  private  supply  was more  common  in outlying  areas-a  pattern
exactly  the reverse  of that in the United States  (Hannah  1979:214-23).
The impetus  in 1926  for the first major restructuring  of Great  Britain's  electrical  utilities
came  from perceptions  that the small  scale  of the country's  electrical  utilities  was so inefficient
that national  prestige  and economic  prospects  were threatened. A broad consensus  among
Britain's  political  leadership  had developed  concerning  this issue, and Stanley  Baldwin's
conservative  government  presided  over the reform. In response  to problems  and high  costs
arising  from the small  scale  of both private  and government-owned  utilities,  Parliament  established
a new, quasi-public  entity  to build  a national  grid that would  link systems  and to coordinate  the
investment  in and operation  of generating  plants.
Under  the plan, existing  government  and privately  owned  utilities  retained  ownership  of
generating  and distribution  systems,  but a newly  created  Central  Electricity  Board was placed  in
charge  of the construction  and operation  of a nationwide  transmission  network. The board
bought  the electricity  produced  by undertakings,  determined  the use made of existing  generating
plants, and oversaw  the planning  of new capacity. In many  respects,  the organization  created  to
carry through  the work resembled  the public  authority  arrangements  under development  in the
United  States during  the same  period. The organization  represented  a form of government  in that
ownership  was in the hands of the state and officials  were appointed. All equity  remained  in the
hands of the state, with private  capital  only  being  drawn  on in the form of bonds. Members  of the
board were appointed  for five-year  terms  by the Minister  of Transport  and could not be dismissed.
Managers  and engineers  drew government  salaries  but were not part of the civil  service  (Hughes
1983:350-62).
In 1947,  the entire  electric  utility  industry  was nationalized.  Although  carried  through  by
a Labour  government  as part of a broader effort  to reshape  British  society,  the shift  was in some
respects  quite modest. Since,  by 1947,  the bulk of Britain's  electric  utility  industry  was already  in
government  hands,  it can be interpreted  as a continuation  of previous  efforts  to centralize  the
electric  utility  industry  so as to better exploit  economies  of scale. But despite  the creation  of the
grid and substantial  consolidation,  more  than 600 franchised  electric  supply  undertakings  still
operated,  of which  about 200 accounted  for 90 percent of sales and investments  (Hannah
1979:213).  Requirements  for the Central  Electricity  Board to purchase  electricity  from these
undertakings  introduced  both coordination  difficulties  and rigidities  of various sorts. The act
nationalizing  the industry  consolidated  these  undertakings  into twelve  new regional  distribution
corporations. Generating  and transmission  was placed  in the hands  of a Central  British  Electricity
Authority.
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change to be implemented in different directions.  As part of a broader conservative program to
reduce the role of the government in the economy and create an "enterprise society" during the
1980s, Great Britain initiated a sweeping privatization program  encompassing a wide array of
infrastructures and industries, including both waterworks and electric utilities (Vickers and Wright
1989:1-30; Heald 1989:31-48; Grimstone 1989:103-17).  At least in water and electricity,
however, this has not meant a simple reversion to earlier patterns of industry structure and
ownership.  In waterworks, the 1973 division of the country into ten regional service areas
survived.  Privatization consisted of selling off equity in the monopoly water and sewerage
provider in each region to private investors.  No direct competition in the provision or
management of services was envisioned. A new national regulatory agency headed by a single
individual (the Director General of Water Services) was given responsibility for protecting
consumer interests and ensuring that the service provider did not exploit its monopoly position.
In addition, responsibility for environmental regulation was placed in the hands of a new National
Rivers Authority (Maclean 1991:37-54).
In electric utilities, on the other hand, an effort was made to both preserve the economies
of scale opened up by previous reform efforts and simultaneously  to increase the role of
competition in protecting consumer interests and inspiring entrepreneurial vigor.  Two separate
generating companies were created so as to introduce at least a measure of competition.  The
twelve distribution companies created by privatization were also given the authority to supply a
small portion of their own electricity as a further source of competitive discipline  in generation.
Retaining a unified national transmission network was seen as indispensable if competition in bulk
power markets were to have even a chance of developing. Ownership was placed in the hands of
the twelve distribution companies so as to help to ensure that monopoly would not be abused by
suppliers of bulk electricity. As in waterworks, a new national regulatory agency (the Director
General of Electricity Supply) was set up to oversee the entire arrangement (Roberts, Elliott, and
Houghton  1991).
France has had somewhat different patterns, with privately owned service providers
furnishing much greater amounts of water in urban centers than in either Great Britain or the
United States.  But whereas privately owned utilities furnish the bulk of the electricity consumed
in the United States, provision in France is entirely in the hands of a single nationalized company.
This outcome can be accounted for in part by differences in structures of political institutions and
political culture.  France, like the United States, has long presented a picture of fragmented local
government.  From the time of the French Revolution to the present, the country has been divided
into more than 36,000 local communes responsible for many local governmental functions and
service provision.  These units have been jealous of their authority but are often quite small in size
and possessed of limited financial and administrative  resources.  While intergovernmental
cooperation between communes has occurred in the provision of services, fragmentation of
governmental authority seems to have favored private provision as it has in the United States.  In
such a setting, private waterworks and construction firms have found it possible to acquire the
technical and administrative capabilities and economies of scale in the construction and operation
of infrastructures to a greater extent than have the communes (Lorrain 1992).
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owned  waterworks,  in France  only  34 percent of the waterworks  in the central  communes  of
urban areas  (population  of 23,000  or more) are both owned  and operated  by the government.  On
the other hand,  only 12 percent  of such  systems  are both owned  and operated  by private  water
utilities. In the bulk of cases,  private  firms  administer  and operate waterworks  even  collecting
charges  from customers,  while  the physical  facilities  themselves  remain  in the hands of the
communes. As in the United States,  French  waterworks  and other municipal  infrastructures
during  the nineteenth  century  were either  franchised  out to privately  owned service  providers  or
both owned and operated  by municipal  governments.  Over time,  however,  "this  dual pattern
quickly  underwent  a number  of modifications,  all of which  tended  to attenuate  the differences.
Jurisprudence  added guaranteed  result clauses  to the franchises. Other  types of contracts  were
developed  at the same  time. Their  common  feature  was that they combined  private  management
with public  financing  and a transfer  of ownership  to the public  sector  for the most costly
equipment  such as water and waste  treatment  plants,  and sewage  stations"  (Lorrain 1992:  84).
The continued  viability  of private  involvement  in the provision  of water in French  urban
centers  is partially  explained  by factors  similar  to those which  shaped  the functioning  of franchise
and contract arrangements  in U.S. waterworks  and electric  utilities. By allowing  for private  firms
to operate but not to own  waterworks  facilities,  many  French  cities  seemed  to have sidestepped
the difficulties  in arranging  for investment  that so plagued  their American  counterparts.
Secondary  accounts  of experiences  in French cities  emphasize  the long  term character  of the
relationships  built up between  municipalities  and privately  owned service  providers. Nevertheless,
the French  separation  of ownership  from operations  unquestionably  made possible  shorter
contract  lengths  and may  have  increased  the role of recurrent  bidding  as an inducement  to good
performance.
In addition,  at least  during  the nineteenth  century,  demands  for expansion  and ongoing
rebuilding  of urban  waterworks  were smaller  in France  than in the United States. Starting  from a
much  smaller  base, major cities  in the United States grew far more quickly  than did their
counterparts  in France. Patterns of land  use also differed.  Building  densities  in French cities  were
fairly  uniform. In the United  States, by contrast,  outlying  residential  areas sprawled  even as the
cores of major  cities  became  packed  with tall buildings.  This pattern of growth made  for heavy
demands  for water main  extensions  to serve  outlying  areas  and for water main  enlargements,  both
to serve  consumers  and to protect against  fire in the increasingly  built-up  centers.
Furthermore,  the great bulk of residential,  commercial,  and even  industrial  structures  in
most cities  in the United States  were made of wood, with highly  flammable  "balloon  frame"
construction  dominating  from the 1830s  onward. Without  adequate  waterworks  capabilities,  even
small  fires could easily  develop  into city-destroying  conflagrations  in such a setting. Due to both
differences  in factor endowments  and far stricter  building  codes  than in the United States,  by
contrast,  most cities  in France  were built  predominantly  of stone  and brick and other relatively  fire
proof materials. As a consequence,  protection  against  conflagration  in French cities  required  less
investment  in waterworks  facilities  to meet day-to-day  consumer  needs than  in the United  States
(Sutcliffe 1981:99-128; Rosen 1986:95-108).
28Electricity development in France also occurred under the jurisdiction of the communes,
and here, too, at least the possibility for evolution of such mixed arrangements existed. But unlike
the case of waterworks, informed opinion during the 1920s began to view construction of inter-
connected systems on a regional or even national scale as desirable. But with oversight in the
hands of the communes, numerous jurisdictional and political obstacles obstructed such
development.  One author described the situation during the 1930s as follows:
The maze of rival institutions made systematic interconnection ever more elusive
and supply efficiencies suffered accordingly. Local authorities were unable to
develop gridding strategies among districts and when private utilities developed
interregional transmission links, regies [systems owned by communes] and co-ops
lacked protection against monopolistic pricing practices.  Thus by the onset of the
Depression, several problems in the utility industry were becoming clear:
efficiency seemed to require centralized control, yet many citizens were reluctant
to allow the controlling power to reside in private hands.  At the same time,
measures reinforcing local autonomy militated against the very centralization that
efficiency criteria seemed to warrant (Frostl991:13-14).
The situation after World War II was even worse.  The war left France's electric utility
industry with extensive physical damage to transmission facilities and generating plants.
Reconstruction demanded large infusions of capital, yet utility firms themselves were nearly
bankrupt.  Indeed, the firms did not even have enough money on hand to pay for the imported
coal needed to fuel their existing generating plants. Faced with price controls and investor fears
of expropriation, raising the capital needed to rebuild was out of the question.
But France, like Great Britain, possessed a unitary national government that could cut
through this sort of impasse, and in 1946 it enacted legislation nationalizing virtually the entire
electric utility industry.  A case can be made that less radical steps such as the lifting of price
controls or the granting of subsidies to France's private utility firms might have served to alleviate
the immediate crisis faced by the industry.  But many elites across the political spectrum viewed
the sorts of institutional bottlenecks that had obstructed industry development during the 1920s
and 1930s as even more intolerable in light of the need for abundant power for economic
development and for building a new and better society in the post-war world.
A huge and heroic hydro program envisioned by Resistance study groups would
end a dangerous dependence on [imported] coal, alleviate trade deficits, and
contribute to national energy independence. Gargantuan darns were to be icons of
a new, modernized France, just as they had been in the United States with the
Norris, Shasta, and Grand Coulee projects.  Experts and politicians agreed that a
utility (and preferably hydro) boom was essential for France's economic revival
(Frost 1991:36-37).
Particularly on the left, nationalization was also supported as a means to reduce class divisions,
build a more egalitarian society, and eliminate the undue and corrupting influence of utility owners
on politics (Frost 1991:39-58).
29Condusions
This report presents a summary of the rich and varied experiences of both private and
public sector entities in the provision of urban services in the United States, France, and Great
Britain over the last hundred years.  The main focus, on private, profit-seeking firms, shifts back
and forth between the private and public sectors and other forms of operational and fiscal
arrangements.  Forms of organization (such as rural electric distribution cooperatives and other
locally  based non-profit yet nongovernmental entities) receive scant attention here, not because
they are unimportant but because they have sufficiently  unique attributes to deserve separate and
extended discussion and analysis.
As can be seen in the preceding accounts, private firms have played a wide range of roles
in the provision of infrastructures as owners, operators, lessees, contractors, and builders of
facilities. Private firms and propertyowners associations of various sorts have owned outright
both toll roads and residential streets in the United States.  Solid waste collection in American
cities has been carried out by private firms paid for directly by consumers and under contract with
municipal governments.  Urban transit has been provided by private firms under a range of
franchise, contracting, and regulatory arrangements in the United States and Great Britain.  While
waterworks facilities in France are predominantly government owned, private firms operate and
manage the bulk of systems under an array of contracting and leasing arrangements. Throughout
the world, portions of many of the infrastructures owned and operated by governments have been
built by private firms.
Decisionmaking concerning infrastructure development, sorts of public goods demanded,
and roles played by private firms has been shaped by the values of politically  important actors and
the workings of governmental, political, and legal institutions.  With respect to the role of private
firms specifically, beliefs as to the "publicness"  of different goods and services have been of
crucial importance in shaping the character of regulatory, franchising, and contracting
arrangements.  In situations in which a good has been seen as predominantly private, it has been
possible for privately owned service providers to be compensated predominantly from user fees
and to leave to them the bulk of decisions as to price, output, and quality of service. By contrast,
when goods have been seen as public and subsidized from tax payer revenues or provided entirely
free to consumers, many decisions as to price, output, and quality have had to be made by
government agencies, no matter what the role played by privately owned service providers in
actually furnishing outputs.
Goods defined as "public" have often been provided free to users, even though exclusion
of nonpayers would impose few technical difficulties. Examples from the United States  would
include the interstate highway system, public parks, public libraries, and police and fire protection
services. The reasons for defining such goods and services as public and furnishing access free of
charge have included economic development goals and the idea that, in some domains of public
and civic interaction, market relations do not apply. Others hold that exclusion of nonpayers from
parks, streets, and other places defined as public could amount to a denial of political and
individual rights.  Probably the single most important change in recent years along this dimension
has been the growing importance of environmental concerns.  Concern for the environment has
increased demands for investments in types of infrastructures such as wastewater treatment plants.
30At the same  time, increased  attention  has been drawn  to the public  "bads"  (as well as the public
goods) of developing  many  sorts of infrastructures  (including  highways,  large dams  for provision
of electricity,  urban  water supply,  and irrigation,  and conventional  and nuclear  thermal  electric
generating  plants).
Choices  as to private  and governmental  provision  of infrastructures  have  also been shaped
by ideas  and ideals concerning  the role of the state in the economy. The far greater role played  by
private  firms  in the provision  of electric  utilities  in the United  States than in Great  Britain during
the early  years of these industries,  for example,  can be attributed  in substantial  part to broad
differences  in beliefs  concerning  appropriate  roles for governments  to play  in furnishing  and
overseeing  essential  services. The much  larger role of the state in furnishing  telecommunications
services  in continental  Europe  than in the United States can also be understood,  at least in part, in
these  terms. Issues in other domains  have  also shaped  debate  and decisionmaking  at various
times. In both the United  States and Great  Britain,  for example,  the contracting  out of public
services  has been  both supported  and opposed  because of its potential  to break the power of
public  sector unions  and to reduce  workers' pay. In the United States, at least, issues  of social
and racial  justice are also involved  because  government  employment  has historically  offered
avenues  of advancement  to members  of some  minority  groups. Privatization,  some  fear,  may
choke off such  opportunities  (Suggsl989).
Experiences  with private  involvement  in the provision  of infrastructures  have  been shaped
by contingencies  of political  and institutional  development  and idiosyncrasies  of time, place,  and
circumstance.  Constraints  on geographical  expansion  faced by government  and privately  owned
systems  have  been particularly  important. In the case of electric  utilities  in the United States,  for
example,  distribution  by municipally  owned  systems  has generally  been confined  to service  within
the boundaries  of individual  cities,  while  private  firms  could extend  their lines  with far less regard
for jurisdictional  boundaries. In such a setting,  privately  owned electric  utilities  could exploit
economies  of scale opened  up by new technologies  in ways  denied  their municipally  owned
counterparts. In Great Britain,  by contrast,  both government  and private  systems  faced
constraints  on expansion. Creation  of a quasi-public  national  grid in 1926  was supported  by many
private  as weli  as government-ownership  advocates  as simply  the most practical  route to break
the log  jam created  by inefficient  distribution.
Certain  commonalities  can be discerned  in experiences  with the private  provision  of
infrastructures.  As economic  theory predicts,  lack  of direct competition  and provision  of service
through  long-lived,  capital-intensive,  and networked  facilities  have  consistently  gone together  in a
wide range of contexts. Where  heavy  facilities  of this sort are in place  (such as water mains  and
sewage  lines),  competition  has been almost  unknown. In intermediate  cases  (such as telephone
and electric  utility  networks,  in which  costs of stringing  wire are comparatively  low), competitive
episodes  have  usually  proven  short-lived. Interestingly,  just about the only cases of sustained
competition  between electric  utility distributors  in the United  States has been in cities  such as
Cleveland,  in which  one of the competitors  was government-owned.  Where  fixed  facilities  play  a
comparatively  limited  role (as in intercity  bus transport,  urban  taxis,  garbage  collection,  water
delivery  by water carriers,  etc.) sustained  competition  between  private  firms  has been more
common  although  many  examples  of monopoly  can be found in this domain  as well.
31A second  common  theme  has been  longevity  of tenure. In situations  in which  private  firms
actually  own  fixed  and long-lived  infrastructure  facilities,  displacement  of existing  service
providers  by new entrants  has been quite  uncommon,  even  in situations  in which  contracts  or
franchises  have  been  recurrently  put out to bid. Contract  lengths  can be shorter and recurrent
bidding  may  be more powerful  as a source  of accountability  under arrangements  in which  private
firms  operate but do not own facilities.  Waterworks  and other services  in many  cities  in France
are furnished  under such arrangements.  But even  here, long  tenures have  been  the norm. This
theme, too, is consistent  with economic  theory (Williamson  1985:61-63).
Policymakers  seeking  ways  to improve  infrastructure  provision  in developing  countries
through  increased  private sector involvement  are unlikely  to confront circumstances  exactly
identical  to those in the United  States, France,  or Great  Britain. Indeed,  experiences  with
different  ownership  and regulatory  arrangements  have  been  quite varied  even  in these countries
To an even greater extent,  the competition  in domestic  markets  for goods and services,  well-
developed  capital  markets,  and effective  administrative  structures  of the United  States, Great
Britain,  and France,  cannot  be assumed  to be present  in many  developing  countries  (Persaud
1992).
At the same  time,  however,  common  factors  can be identified  that have consistently
shaped  outcomes  in the context of the limited  direct  competition  and long tenures characteristic  of
many  forms of private  involvement  in the provision  of infrastructures  under even  the best of
circumstances.  Lessons  of the past cannot  be uncritically  applied  by contemporary
decisionmakers  without close  attention  to context. Yet the very fact that some  similar  factors  can
be identified  as shaping  outcomes  amidst  diverse  contexts in the United States,  France, and Great
Britain  is at least suggestive  of possibilities  for broader  applicability.
One set of factors  concerns  the extent  to which  privately  owned  service  providers  are
motivated  to perform  well  without  imposing  demands  on enforcement  and regulatory
arrangements  and  the administrative  capacities  of government  agencies. Burdens on oversight
arrangements  depend  in part on market  incentives  faced  by private  firms. For reasons  described
previously,  the role played  by direct  competition  between  privately  owned  firms  is likely  be quite
attenuated  in many  situations,  even  if contract  duration  is short and recurrent  bidding  is
attempted. Market  incentives  can arise  from other sources,  however,  and in such cases  the profit
motive  can be a powerful  spur for efficiency,  innovation,  and responsiveness  to consumer
demands  on the part of privately  owned  service  providers. In the case of electric  utilities  in the
United  States, for example,  the increased  profits  to be realized  by increasing  off-peak  demands
and inter-product  competition  functioned  as market  incentives  for good performance  during  the
first decades  of the twentieth  century. As a result, state regulators  intervened  little  in private
decisionmaking.
As  noted previously,  decisions  as to pricing  are also of crucial  importance. In situations  in
which  service  providers  are compensated  entirely  from  user fees and a degree  of market discipline
is present,  burdens  of decisionmaking  and enforcement  faced  by government  agencies  may  be
quite light. When  a good or service  is subsidized  or furnished  free to consumers  in order to
achieve  some  public  purpose,  on the other hand,  contracting  arrangements  of one sort or another
may  be needed. Such contracting  can be a relatively  straightforward  matter if output and quality
32of service  is easy to specify  and monitor. Even under static  conditions,  however,  the problem  of
devising  a workable,  long-term  relationship  between  contractor  and contractee  may  be far less
tractable  in cases  in which  output and quality  are difficult  to specify  in unanbiguous  terms. As
could  be seen in the case of water for fire protection  in the United  States,  the new difficulties  arise
under  conditions  of change. Under such circumstances,  problems  and conflicts  in renegotiating
contract  terms with private  vendors  can result  in rigidities  that exceed  those of all  but the most
rigid  of public  bureaucracies.
Clearly,  attributes  of markets  and extents  to which  infrastructures  serve  public  purposes
both bear close examination  in considering  whether  and how to increase  roles played  by private
firms. The findings  also have some  more subtle  implications  that relate to the administrative
capabilities  of governments  themselves.  One of the major  advantages  of privatization  is that it can
reduce  the role of government  bureaucracies  in performing  entrepreneurial  activities  for which
they  may  be poorly  suited. At the same  tirne,  however,  overseeing  provision  of specifically  public
services  by privately  owned service  providers  and ensuring  that such competition  as is possible
does take place  are also activities  that require  substantial  expertise  and developed  administrative
capabilities  on the part of government  agencies. Where  market  forces are weak and important
public  interests  are at stake,  therefore,  the strengthening  of governmental  institutions  may  be a
prerequisite  for successful  privatization.
The form taken by privatization  may  also be important. In both Great  Britain  and the
United  States, infrastructure  policy  has involved  not only shifts  between  private  and governmental
provision  but interventions  into the structures  of privately  owned  service  providers  themselves.
Examples  of such interventions  include  the restructuring  of Great Britain's  electric  utilities  during
the 1920s  and the break-up  of American  Telephone  and Telegraph  during  the 1980s. Exploitation
of opportunities  afforded  by new technologies  to exploit  economies  of scale  or increase
competition  were among  the objectives  in both cases. Particularly  for smaller,  developing
countries  dependent  upon multinational  corporations  for infrastructure  investments,  however,
such direct  interventions  into corporate  structure  may  not be feasible  as means  to adjust to
changing  conditions.
In such cases,  opportunities  to benefit  from competition  between  private  firms  and to
flexibly  accommodate  changing  conditions  may  be maximized  by retaining  ownership  of fixed
assets in government  hands even  as construction  or operation  are contracted  out.  Such
approaches  have  been used to develop  waterworks  not only  in France  but in the C8te d'Ivoire
(Roth 1987:263-64).  Depending  upon circumstances,  other alternatives  (such as provision  by
independent  non-profit  organizations  or some  other sort of quasi-public  entity)  may  be worthy  of
consideration  as well.
None of these choices,  of course, should  be viewed  as a panacea. Trade-offs  are
unavoidable,  their magnitude  cannot  always  be easily  ranked  in advance,  and matters  do not
always  play  out exactly  as expected. What is clear,  however,  is that for any evaluation  of different
private  and public  alternatives  for the provision  of infrastructures  to have even  a chance  of
producing  realistic  results,  local contexts and the affects  of time, change,  and other contingencies
must be taken into account.
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